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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Recent media and public attention has focused on CEO compensation.  This study looks at the 
relationship between CEO compensation and several measures of firm performance across a wide 
variety of industries.  The study used a database of CEO compensation for 200 large public 
companies which filed proxy statements with the SEC for 2007.  Total CEO compensation consists 
of:  base salary, cash bonuses, perks, stock awards, and option awards.  The measures of firm 
performance were:  company revenue, year-to-year change in net income, and year-to-year 
change in total shareholder return (TSR).  Correlation and regression analysis were used to test 
various hypotheses.  We expected that total CEO compensation and its components would be 
directly related to financial measures of company performance.      
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INTRODUCTION 
 
ith the economy contracting and stock prices falling, recent media and public attention has focused 
on CEO and executive compensation.  When most companies were reporting favorable results 
quarter after quarter and year after year, this subject was of interest primarily to academic 
researchers.  Occasionally, there have been proxy resolutions brought forth by shareholders and shareholder groups 
to “rubber stamp” compensation schemes approved by the boards of directors of public companies.   In 2007 and 
2008, Congress held several hearings on excessive pay and heard calls for action, but little was taken. 
 
Earlier this year, President Obama called Wall Street bankers "shameful" for giving themselves nearly $20 
billion in bonuses as the economy was deteriorating and the government was spending billions to bail out some of 
the nation's biggest and well known banks and financial institutions. 
 
Subsequently, the Obama administration announced a salary cap of $500,000 for top executives at 
companies that receive the largest amounts of money under the $700 billion Federal bailout program, calling the 
step an expression not only of fairness but of "basic common sense."  
 
The public's recent interest in executive pay stems from two sources.   First, toward the end of 2006, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission set tighter rules for corporate proxies requiring more information about the 
methods used to compile pay packages for top management. Second, the sinking economy increased stockholder 
discontent -- especially when executive pay rose as share prices declined.    The average overall compensation in 
2007 for chief executives at 200 large companies that had filed proxies by the following March 28 approached $12 
million. 
 
Our study was conducted in the second quarter of 2008.  It used data from 2007.  It looked at the 
relationship between total CEO compensation and measures of firm performance across a wide variety of industries.  
We also looked at the relationship between components of CEO compensation and measures of firm performance.   
 
 
W 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
There has been a great deal of academic research on executive compensation starting in the late 1950’s.  
Subsequently, there are several noteworthy articles, including those written by Lewellen, W. and B. Huntsman 
(1970), Ciscel, D. and T. Carroll (1980), Coughlan and Schmidt (1985),  K.J. Murphy (1985, 1986), and M. Jensen 
and K.J. Murphy (1990).   
 
P. Kostiuk (1990) and Baker, Jensen, and Murphy (1988) published articles about firm size and executive 
compensation.  K.J. Murphy (1999) observed that while companies use a variety of financial and non-financial 
measures in their annual bonus plans for executives, most use a single measurement such as revenues, net income, 
pre-tax income, operating profits (EBIT), or economic value added.       
 
In 1999, K. J. Murphy wrote a paper on “Executive Compensation” which summarized empirical and 
theoretical research on executive compensation and description of trends in pay practices for CEO pay.   He 
observed that pay practices vary across firms, industries, and countries.  There has been a dramatic shift in pay 
practices over time (more pay and more forms of compensation).   
 
In 2004, K.J. Murphy and J. Zabojnik wrote an article and observed that some people believe that recent 
increases in pay reflect increased power that self-dealing CEOs wield over captive boards. This increased power, the 
argument goes, allows the CEOs to extract more “rents” from their companies, at the expense of the companies' 
workers and shareholders.  They argued that the “rent-extraction” explanation is not entirely convincing, and they 
offered a market-based explanation of the recent trends.   Increases in executive compensation can be explained by 
an increase in the importance of general skills, as opposed to firm-specific knowledge, to manage  modern 
corporations. 
 
In an article entitled, “The SEC’s Disclosure Law and CEO Compensation,” R. Kamery (2004) discovered 
that new compensation disclosures changed the determinants of pay.  Boards of directors which formerly looked at 
peer group performance within or outside of the industry (market based measures) had to focus more on financial 
indicators of firm performance.   They looked at periods before and after 1993 when the SEC required boards to 
justify their reasons for the level of CEO compensation.       
 
Nourayi, M. and F. Daroca (2008) in an article entitled, “CEO Compensation, Firm Performance, and 
Operational Characteristics” examined pay in companies in both regulated and unregulated industries and relative to 
sales, number of employees,  and the nature of the business (in terms of new-economy and old-economy).    The 
data used was from 1996-2002.  
 
Nourayi, M. and S. Mintz (2008) in an article entitled, “Tenure, Firm’s Performance, and CEO’s 
Compensation”  looked at the influence of firm performance and CEO cash and total compensation based on time in 
that position .  Firm size appeared to be a significant explanatory variable for CEO cash and total compensation 
regardless of CEO tenure and measure of performance.  The data used was from 2001-2002. 
 
Prior research studies have found a small but significant link between total CEO compensation and firm 
performance.  However, these studies used relatively old data or focused on traditional forms of pay without 
adequate consideration of stock awards and options.  The data used in these studies was extracted from annual 
reports or shareholder proxy statements under the old SEC reporting rules.   Our study looked at the relationship 
between total CEO pay and its components under the most recent SEC rules and measures of firm performance..  
         
RESEARCH DESIGN AND HYPOTHESES 
 
This study used several measures of executive compensation and measures of firm performance.   
 
There is no consensus of what is meant by firm performance and prior studies have used a variety of 
financial and non-financial measures.  Particularly troublesome is the time horizon over which to measure firm 
performance.  Is a CEO hired for what he/she can do for a company in the short run or long run?  Is the 
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compensation scheme based on past pay and performance with former employers with an expectation he/she can do 
it all over again?  Or is based on a compensation consultant’s report supplied to a compensation committee based on 
market factors?  
   
Correlation and regression analysis were used to test various hypotheses.  We expected that total CEO 
compensation and its components such as base pay and cash bonuses to be directly related to financial measures of 
firm performance. 
 
THE SAMPLE AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
In this part of the paper, we describe our data source, the sample, and variables used in this research study.   
 
The study was based on CEO compensation data for 2007 from 200 large public companies which filed 
proxy statements with the SEC by March 31, 2008.  Each company had total reported revenue in excess of $6.5 
billion.  The data was compiled by Equilar, Inc., an executive compensation research firm and reported in the 
Sunday edition of The New York Times on April 6, 2008.  The data is available on-line at:   
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2008/04/05/business/20080405_EXECCOMP_GRAPHIC.html 
 
The data was not in Excel format. 
 
Under new SEC disclosure rules, all public companies must now file detailed compensation data in proxy 
statements.  The rules were effective for all companies whose fiscal years ended on or after December 31, 2006.   
 
Descriptive statistics for companies included in the sample is presented in Table 1.  Total revenue ranged 
from $6,592,000,000 to $194,495,000,000.  Percent change in net income ranged from -91% to 206% and percent 
change in TSR ranged from -96% to 120%.    There were 72 different industries included in the sample.  Information 
about the companies in the largest industrial classifications (more than four companies) is presented in Table 2.  The 
industries with the largest representations were banking (10) followed by conventional electricity (8), food products 
(8), and pharmaceuticals (7).         
 
VARIABLES USED TO MEASURE CEO COMPENSATION 
 
There were six variables use to measure CEO compensation:   
 
1.   Base Salary 
 
Annual pay that does not depend on the company’s results. By law, any amount exceeding $1 million is not 
tax deductible by  the company. The annual salary for a CEO who served only part of the year was derived 
eitherfrom information disclosed by the company about the new chief’s contract, or byprorating the salary based on 
the time actually served in the position. 
 
2.   Cash Bonus  
 
The sum of all cash payments to executives in addition to salary, including those based on performance as 
well as those that are purely discretionary. 
 
3.   Perks/Other   
 
Miscellaneous pay, not linked to performance, that includes such disparate items  as, moving expenses, 
personal use of corporate aircraft, and the value of assorted other benefits, including contributions to 401(k) plans 
and company-paid premiums for supplemental life insurance. The new disclosure rules from the Securities and 
Exchange Commission mandate that companies disclose all perquisites and benefits unless their aggregate value is 
less than $10,000. 
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4.   Stock Awards* 
 
The aggregate value on the grant date of incentive plan or service-based stock and/or unit awards, as 
reported by the company. Incentive plan stock awards are earned for attaining some predetermined goals. Service-
based stock awards vest if the executive stays with the company for a set period of time.   
 
5.   Option Awards*  
 
The aggregate value on the grant date of incentive plan or service-based awards of stock options or stock 
appreciation rights, as reported by the company. As with the stock  awards, incentive plan option awards are earned 
for attaining some predetermined goals, while service-based option awards vest if the executive stays for the 
company for a set period of time. 
 
6.   Total Compensation  
 
The total compensation represents the sum of base salary, discretionary and performance-based cash 
bonuses, stock awards, option awards, and other compensation like benefits and perquisites.   
 
Information about CEO compensation for companies within the sample is presented in Table 3 and Figures 
1-6.  Base salaries ranged from $0 to $8.1 million with Steve Jobs of Apple Computer receiving $1 per year.  Cash 
bonuses ranged from $0 to $26,985,474; perks/other ranged from $0 to $3,220,157, the value of stock awards ranged 
from $0 to $36,179,923 and value of option awards ranged from $0 to $50,087,100.  Total compensation ranged 
from $1 to $83,785,021 (John Thain, former CEO of Merrill Lynch). 
 
VARIABLES USED TO MEASURE COMPANY PERFORMANCE 
 
There were three variables used to measure company performance for 2007: 
 
1.   Total Revenue  
 
Company revenue for 2007.  The amounts were not adjusted to reflect spin-offs or restatements. And some 
financial institutions reported only revenues derived from interest income. 
 
*Both stock and option award amounts include the value of all service-based and performance-based awards on the 
day that they were granted.  If the company reported those values, its numbers were used.  If it did not, Equilar used 
the assumptions that the company provided to generate the numerical value. 
 
2.   Percent Change in Net Income 
 
The percentage change in the company’s net income from continuing operations, before accounting 
changes and extraordinary items, from fiscal 2006 to fiscal 2007.  
 
3.   Percent Change in Total Shareholder Return (TRS) 
 
The percentage change in shareholder return (TSR) from the beginning to the end of fiscal 2007, assuming 
that dividends were reinvested.  Total Shareholder Return (TSR) is  a concept used to compare the performance of 
different companies’ stocks and shares over time. It combines share price appreciation and dividends paid to show 
the total  return to the shareholder. The absolute size of the TSR will vary with stock markets, but the relative 
position reflects the market perception of overall performance relative to a reference group. 
 
With Pricebegin = share price at beginning of period, Priceend = share price at end of period,  Dividends = dividends 
paid and TSR = Total Shareholder Return, TSR is computed as:   
TSR = (Priceend − Pricebegin + Dividends) / Pricebegin 
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CORRELATION ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
The results of the study showed no significant correlation between total CEO compensation and change in 
net income or change in TSR.   However, there was a significant correlation between total compensation and total 
revenue.  In other words, the larger the company in terms of the sales, the more its CEO received.   The Pearson 
correlation coefficient (0.299) was significant at the 0.1 level.   
 
Base salary was significantly correlated with total revenue (.188 Pearson correlation coefficient at the .01 
level), but there was no statistically significant correlation between base salary and percentage change in company 
net income or percent change in TSR.  
 
CEO cash bonuses were significantly correlated with measures of firm performance – total revenue, change 
in net income, and change in TSR, with Pearson correlation coefficients of  0.290, 0.153, and 0.167,  respectively, at 
the .05 level except for total revenue at the .01 level.    
 
The value of perks, stock awards, and option awards were not statistically correlated with percent change in 
net income or the percent change in TSR .        
 
Option awards were not significantly correlated with total revenue which is not surprising. 
 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
We set up several regressions with components of CEO  (base salary, cash bonus, perks, value of stock 
awards, and value of option awards) as dependent variables and total revenue, change in net income, change in TSR 
as independent variables (predictors of components of CEO compensation).  See Tables 4-8.  Using stepwise 
regression, we discovered that company revenue was the only statistically significant variable (at the .01 level) as a 
predictor of all of the individual components of CEO compensation except for perks (significant at the .05 level) and 
r the value of option awards.  The r
2
s were relatively low for each regression: 
 
Base salary   .039 
Cash bonus   .113 
Perks    .023 
Stock awards   .074 
 
The regression for the value of option awards as the dependent variable did not work using stepwise 
regression, because the r
2
s were too small.  Instead, we used the “enter” method to force the independent variables 
into the model.  None of them proved to be statistically significant as predictors of the dollar amount of option 
awards.    
  
Finally, we set up a regression equation for total CEO compensation as the dependent variable and total 
revenue, change in net income, change in TSR as independent variables (predictors of total CEO compensation).  
See Table 9.   Again, using stepwise regression, company revenue was the only statistically significant variable (at 
the .01 level) as a predictor of the total CEO compensation, but with a  r
2 
 of only .10.  Percentage change in net 
income and percent change in TSR were not significant factors.   
 
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
While there is a presumed strong relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance, we did 
not find this to be the case.  The exception was total revenue, but with a low r
2
 of only .10.  CEO compensation is 
higher in larger firms.  This is consistent with the findings in other studies.  Presumably, larger companies can afford 
to hire better-paid CEOs with the expectation that they are better qualified to lead when times are good (years 
leading up to 2007).  We are not sure about this statement, when the general economy turns bad (2008 and beyond).       
 
Journal of Business & Economics Research – November, 2009 Volume 7, Number 11 
86 
Firm performance as measured by total company revenue is a significant factor in determining base salary, 
cash bonuses, perks, and the value of stock awards.  However, the r
2
s were relatively low.    
 
LIMITATIONS 
 
The findings are limited to the 200 companies in the database compiled by Equilar.  The study only 
included CEO compensation for one year (namely, 2007), and measures of firm performance over one time period 
(2006 to 2007).  The results could be different for other years and other time periods.  There are many measures of 
firm performance which we did not use.  Further study and analysis are needed in this area.    
 
AUTHOR INFORMATION 
 
Catherine T. Jeppson, MS, CPA, is a full-time lecturer in the Dept. of Accounting and Information Systems at 
California State University, Northridge, where she teaches financial accounting, managerial accounting and the 
Gateway Experience, a multiple-disciplinary business course. She is a member of the California Society of CPAs 
Accounting Educators’ Committee.  Her current research interests include international accounting issues including 
IFRS, web-mediated accounting education, and tax strategies for individuals. In addition to teaching and research, 
Professor Jeppson’s background includes serving as the faculty advisor of the Volunteer Income Tax Assistance 
program (VITA) since 1979. 
 
Wayne Smith, PhD, is a part-time lecturer in the Department of Management at California State University, 
Northridge.  Wayne earned his Ph.D. in Information Systems and Technology from Claremont Graduate University 
in 2008.  Academically, he has taught classes in organizational behavior, management of information technology, 
knowledge management, operations, computer science, and introductory accounting at both the undergraduate- and 
graduate-level.  He has published on topics as diverse as telecommunications, web page archiving and volatility, and 
strategic management.  Professionally, he has worked and consulted in a variety of private- and public-sector 
organizations, primarily in the area of information management. 
 
Ronald S. Stone, MBA, PhD, CPA, is a professor in the Dept. of Accounting and Information Systems at California 
State University, Northridge, where he teaches financial accounting and auditing.  He is also a certified fraud 
examiner.  He has published articles on accounting, fraud detection and prevention, and web-mediated accounting 
education.  His current research interests include corporate financial reporting and fraud.  He has served as a 
forensic accountant and expert witness in numerous cases involving white collar crime, embezzlement, consumer 
fraud and contract disputes.   
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
1. “2007 Trends in CEO Pay,” www.aflcio.org/corporatewatch/paywatch/pay/index,cfm. 
2. “Calculating The Pay Figures,” The New York Times, Late Edition (East Coast), New York NY, April 6, 
2008, pg BU.9. 
3. Baker G., M. Jensen, and K.J. Murphy (1988), “Compensation and Incentives:  Practive vs. Theory,” 
Journal of Finance, 43(3), 593-616/ 
4. Canarella, G. and A. Gasparyan (2008), “New Insights into Executive compensation and Firm 
Performance:  Evidence from a Panel of “New Economy Firms, 1996-2002,” 34(8), p. 537-554. 
5. Conyon, M. and K.J. Murphy, “The prince and the pauper? CEO pay in the Unites States and United 
Kingdom,” The Economic Journal, Nov 2000.  Vol. 110,  Iss. 467,  p. F640-F671 (32 pp.). 
6. Coreiro, J. and R. Veliyath (2003), “Beyond Pay for Performance:  A Panel Study of the Determinants of 
CEO Compensation,”  American Business Review, 21, p. 56-66. 
7. Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), “Executive Compensation, Management Turnover, and Firm Performance:  
An Empirical Investigation,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7(1-3), 43-66. 
8. Ciscel, D. and T. Carroll (1980), “The Determinants of Executive Salaries:  An Econometric Survey, 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 62(1), 7-13. 
9. DeCarlos, S. “Executive Pay:  Big Paychecks,” www.forbes.com/2007/03/ceo-executive-compensation 
Journal of Business & Economics Research – November, 2009 Volume 7, Number 11 
87 
10. Jensen, M. and K.J. Murphy (1990), “Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives,” Journal of 
Political Economy, 98(2), 225-64. 
11. Kamery, R. (2004),  “The SEC’s Disclosure Law and CEO Compensation,” Allied Academies International 
Conference, Academy of Legal, Ethical and Regulatory Issues, Proceedings, 8(2), 55-59. 
12. Kostiuk, P.  (1990), “Firm Size and Executive Compensation,” Journal of Human Resources, 25(1), 90-
105. 
13. Lewellen, W. and B. Huntsman (1970), “Managerial Pay and Corp. Performance,” American Economic 
Review, 60(4), 710-20. 
14. Lorsch, J.W. (2006), “Rising CEO Pay:  What Directors Should Do,” Working Knowledge, Harvard 
Business School, http://hbswk.ediitem5490.html. 
15. Murphy, K.J. (1985), “Corporate Performance and Managerial Remuneration:  An Empirical Analysis,” 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7(1-3), 11-42. 
16. Murphy, K.J. (1986), Incentives, Learning, and Compensation:  A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation 
of Managerial Labor Contracts,” Rand Journal of Economics, 17(1), 59-76. 
17. Murphy, K.J. (1999), “Executive Compensation,” USC. 
18. Murphy, K.J. and J. Zabojnik (2004), “CEO Pay and Appointments: A Market-Based Explanation  for 
Recent Trends”, The American Economic Review.  Vol. 94,  Iss. 2,  p. 192-196  
19. Nourayi, M. and F. Daroca (2008), “CEO Compensation, Firm Performance, and Operational 
Characteristics,” Managerial Finance,” 34(8), p.562 
20. Nourayi, M. and S. Mintz (2008), “Tenure, Firm’s Performance, and CEO’s Compensation,” Managerial 
Finance, 34(8), p.524 
21. Yeaton, Karthryn (2007), “The SEC’s New Rules on Executive Compensation:  Illustrating the Disclosure 
Requirements,” The CPA Journal, p. 26-33. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Journal of Business & Economics Research – November, 2009 Volume 7, Number 11 
88 
 
 
Table 2: Companies By Industry (Total Revenue in millions) 
Industry # Min. Max. Mean Median Std Dev 
Banking 10 $7,894 $124,467 $35,699 $16,313 $37,756 
Electricity 8 $9,366 $18,916 $13,507 $13,247 $2,610 
Food Products 8 $7,599 $44,018 $16,864 $12,153 $11,698 
Pharma 7 $18,634 $61,095 $31,430 $24,198 $15,318 
Auto Part 6 $6,769 $34,624 $16,539 $13,419 $9,569 
Pipelines 6 $7,283 $26,714 $14,734 $13,304 $7,251 
Computer 5 $7,004 $104,286 $32,480 $13,873 $36,315 
Diversified Industrials 5 $9,003 $172,738 $50,765 $24,462 $61,642 
Electrical Component 5 $10,384 $22,572 $15,383 $15,681 $4,164 
Financial Services 5 $8,909 $87,968 $60,777 $62,675 $28,422 
Food Retailers 5 $6,592 $35,042 $15,788 $7,201 $11,512 
Specialty Retailers 5 $8,337 $17,692 $12,719 $12,958 $3,609 
 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for CEO Compensation 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Base Salary $0 $8,100,000 $1,131,956 $1,090,834 $655,827 
Cash Bonus $0 $26,985,474 $3,049,362 $2,203,500 $3,513,767 
Perks/ Other $0 $3,220,157 $322,784 $205,780 $400,884 
Stock Awards $0 $36,179,923 $3,852,906 $2,774,620 $4,998,758 
Option Awards $0 $50,087,100 $3,346,081 $2,161,470 $5,557,345 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics for Company Performance (in Millions) 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Total Revenue (in millions) $6,592 $194,495 $26,361 $15,605 $28,643 
Percent Change in NI -91% 206% 12% 0% 38% 
Percent Change in TSR -96% 120% 10% 0% 34% 
Journal of Business & Economics Research – November, 2009 Volume 7, Number 11 
89 
Table 4  Regression – dependent is Base Salary; independents are total revenue, change in NI, and change in TSR 
 
Model Summary 
Model R Square Adjusted R Square 
 .039 .033 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Total Revenue 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Standardized Coefficients 
t Sig. Beta 
 
(Constant)  15.106 .000 
Total Revenue .197 2.679 .008* 
a. Dependent Variable: base sal 
 
 
Table 5  Regression - dependent variable is Cash Bonus 
 
Model Summary 
Model R Square Adjusted R Square 
 .113 .103 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Standardized Coefficients 
t Sig. Beta 
 (Constant)  5.512 .000 
Total Revenue .298 4.182 .000 
Percent Change in Net Income .192 2.694 .008* 
a. Dependent Variable: cash bonus 
 
 
Table 6  Regression – dependent variable is Perks 
 
Model Summary 
Model R Square Adjusted R Square 
 .023 .018 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Total Revenue 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Standardized Coefficients 
t Sig. Beta 
 (Constant)  6.543 .000 
Total Revenue .152 2.056 .041* 
a. Dependent Variable: perks 
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Table 7    Regression - dependent is Stock Awards 
 
Model Summary 
Model R Square Adjusted R Square 
 .074 .068 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Total Revenue 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Standardized Coefficients 
t Sig. Beta 
 
(Constant)  5.558 .000 
Total Revenue .271 3.761 .000* 
a. Dependent Variable: stock awd 
 
 
Table 8  Regression - dependent variable is Option Awards  (stepwise didn’t work because the R-squared is too small;  
we used the “Enter” method to force the variables into the model) 
 
Model Summary 
Model R Square Adjusted R Square 
 .009 -.008 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Total Revenue, Percent Change in TSR, Percent Change in Net Income 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Standardized Coefficients 
t Sig. Beta 
 
(Constant)  5.051 .000 
Percent Change in TSR -.003 -.042 .967 
Percent Change in Net Income .092 1.147 .253 
Total Revenue .045 .590 .556 
a. Dependent Variable: option awd 
 
 
Table 9  Regression  - Total Compensation is the dependent variable 
  
Model R Square Adjusted R Square 
 .100 .085 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Standardized Coefficients 
t Sig. Beta 
 
(Constant)  9.144 .000 
Total Revenue .300 4.156 .000* 
Percent Change in Net Income .110 1.444 .151 
Percent Change in TSR .042 .551 .582 
a. Dependent Variable: total 
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Figure 1  CEO Base Salary 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2   CEO Cash Bonus 
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Figure 3  CEO Perks/Other 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4  CEO Stock Awards 
 
 
 
 
Journal of Business & Economics Research – November, 2009 Volume 7, Number 11 
93 
Figure 5  CEO Option Awards 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6  CEO Total Compensation 
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